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Abstract
This paper extends the literature by developing an objective market-based index, which is
dynamic and continuous and can be used to measure the monetary policy transparency
for a country or, simultaneously, a series of countries. It was found that the more
transparent the monetary policy is, the less risky and volatile the money market will be.
Furthermore, during the tenure of Chairman Greenspan the volatility and risk in the
money market fell. The policy regime changes of adjusting the target rate by multiples of
25 or 50 basis points and including a balance-of-risks sentence in FOMC statements also
resulted in a reduction in volatility in the money markets. 
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I. Introduction
Central banks are unequivocally moving towards greater openness or to more
transparent monetary policy frameworks by engaging in, among other things, inflation
targeting, publishing inflation forecasts and increasing the number of public statements
from bank officials. Whether such moves are desirable or not, or to what degree they are
desirable, is still open to question. The theoretical studies in favor of and/or against more
transparency in central banking, although ample, are not unanimous in their findings, and
empirical tests of these arguments are scarce, mostly because transparency in monetary
policy is a concept hard to measure.
The existing transparency measures have some limitations. Most of them are not
in time-series form and so can be used only for cross-sectional studies. Moreover, they
can only be used for a limited number of hypotheses. They are based on the quantity,
timeliness, and periodicity of information provided by central banks and finally, they are
somehow static. The purpose of this paper is to develop an index, which is dynamic and
continuous and can be used to measure monetary policy transparency for a country or,
simultaneously, a series of countries, using time-series as well as cross-sectional data.
The existing measures of transparency can be divided into four groups:
(i) Descriptive accounts of transparency: This kind of transparency measure
concentrates on strategies that central bankers follow in order to communicate with the
public. It mostly includes do’s and don’ts of the central bankers’ actions, see, e.g.,
Blinder et al. (2001). The main problem with this measure is that no index can be
derived/constructed from these do’s and don’ts.
(ii) Central bank surveys or self-evaluating transparency indexes: A series of
surveys are sent to central banks to investigate the extent to which they communicate
their private information to the public, including the degree to which they are following
the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies
developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see, e.g., Fry et al. (2000) and
Sundararajan et al. (2003). The limitation with this type of measure is that there is a
3possibility for researchers to misunderstand the survey questions and/or for central banks
to manipulate responses to obtain an appropriate score.
(iii) Official documents and information: Researchers construct indexes of
transparency of monetary policy by evaluating the behavior of central bankers (e.g.,
whether they give speeches regularly or not) and the type and frequency of documents the
central bank makes available to the public (such as minutes from meetings, inflation
reports, etc.), see, e.g., Eijffinger and Geraats (2002), de Haan and Amtenbrink (2002),
and Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001). One possible weakness with this approach is that the
particular items looked at and the weight assigned to them by each set of authors may
differ for purely subjective reasons.
Furthermore, these measures quantify the degree of openness of central banks
based on the information provided, but do not necessarily reflect the true degree of
understanding, by the public, of central banking practices. In sum, the common problem
with the above three measures is that they are not in time-series form; instead, they are
calculated for cross-sectional studies. Thus, these measures limit the number of
hypotheses that may be tested concerning the impact of more transparent monetary
policies in the economy. 
Finally, (iv) market-based indicators: These indexes are based on what market
participants understand from the central banks’ actions and signals as well as the
implementation of the monetary policy. The existing market-based indicators also have
limitations. For example, Howells and Mariscal (2002) provide a measure of monetary
policy transparency for a small number of cross-section countries, therefore, limiting the
number of hypotheses that may be tested. 
The degree to which market participants understand and anticipate monetary
policy can also be gauged by using time-series market-based expectations of monetary
policy, and more particularly, high frequency measures of monetary policy surprises. In
general, the time-series market-based measures of policy surprises in the U.S. include
those based on federal funds futures rates, e.g., Poole and Rasche (2000), Kuttner (2001)
and Söderström (2001). These measures restrict the analysis to post 1988, the year when
this market was established. Furthermore, as it was mentioned by Poole et al. (2002), fed
funds rate futures could reflect the expected changes in the target rate only if the times of
4target rate changes were known. Since this information became available only after 1994,
these measures further restrict researchers to post 1994. 
Other measures are based on actual market rates including Treasury bill rates and
Eurodollar deposit rates, e.g., Ellingsen and Söderström (1999) and Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2002). These measures mostly concentrate on a change in the single interest rate
at the time of a target change. Consequently, these measures are static and, more
importantly, they are very narrowly defined since they put too much emphasis on a single
piece of information. Interest rates in general, and especially their relationships, reflect
the behavior of market participants (arbitrageurs and speculators). 
Finally, some policy surprise measures are based on the analysis of the financial
press, e.g., Poole et al. (2002) and Söderström (2001). These measures can be subjective
as the interpretation of the financial press fully depends on the background and
experience of the researchers. The overall limitation of these measures arises from the
fact that they are usually series of unequal intervals. Therefore, they may restrict the
researcher to studies with quarterly or less frequent data or to specific techniques of
estimation such as the factor-model approach which allows the researcher to deal
systematically with data irregularities [e.g., Stock and Watson (2002)].
Consequently, this study attempts to develop an index, which is dynamic and can
be used to measure the monetary policy transparency for a country or, simultaneously, a
series of countries. To the best knowledge of the authors, no such index exists in the
literature. We will develop the measure for the United States monetary policy for the
1982-2003 period. The choice of country is based on the fact that the United States has a
complicated banking system (12 Federal Reserves) with no clear policy objectives, like
inflation targeting, interest rate band, etc. Consequently, the index, if successful in
detecting the Federal Reserve monetary transparency, will be useful to check the central
bank transparency of any country, especially countries like Canada, New Zealand, etc.,
who have clear monetary policy goals like inflation targeting.
Our main contribution to the literature is the construction of a monetary policy
index, which is dynamic and can also be continuous when intraday minute or shorter
interval observations are used. Furthermore, we found, using our index, that the more
transparent the monetary policy is, the less risky and volatile the money market will be. 
5Section II provides a description of our data and of the transparency oriented
reforms at the Fed. Section III is devoted to the theoretical foundation of the index and its
construction. Section IV covers the empirical tests on the power of the index in
investigating the hypothesis that higher transparency reduces risk and volatility in the
money market. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.
II. Data Description 
The daily data on fed funds effective rates and Treasury bill (secondary market)
rates for the period 1982 (October 5)-2003 (December 31) are used. The number of
observations is 5308 days. The source of these data is the St. Louis Federal Reserve
website. We also obtained from the same source the data on the sum of the individual
bank excess reserve positions, but data is in monthly observations. To generate a daily
series we computed an interpolation of the monthly series while maintaining the last
value in each period. An ARIMA(1,1,0) process was used to generate the data with
RATS computer software.
The choice of the sample period is based on the availability of data on target fed
funds rates. According to Sarno and Thornton  (2003, p. 1099), the Fed was explicitly
targeting the funds rate from 1974 to October 1979. The Fed switched to a non-borrowed
reserves operation procedure in October 1979, and in October 1982 switched to a
borrowed reserves operating procedure. However, “Exactly when the Fed switched from
a borrowed reserve operating procedure to an explicit funds rate targeting procedure is
contentious [...] there seems to be general agreement that the Fed has explicitly targeted
the funds rate at least since the late 1980s.” In any event, for the purpose of this paper and
the construction of our index, available target rates with their respective dates are needed.
To the best knowledge of the authors, a non-interrupted set of data on fed funds
target rates is only available from October 1982. For the period 1982-1989 we used a
series prepared by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
This series is based on staff’s unofficial interpretations of FOMC meeting transcripts and
other documents publicly available. We obtained this series through the Secretariat’s
6office of the FOMC but it can also be partially found in Thornton and Wheelock (2000).1
Note that May 7, 1988 corresponds to a Saturday, when markets were closed. Following
Rudebusch (1995), we use May 9, 1988 as the day when the target was changed.
Furthermore, again following Rudebusch, for the target change of “early January 1989”,
we assume January 5 as the day when the target was changed.
For the period 1990 onwards, the series reported on the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System’s website was used (see series under the heading of “intended
federal funds rate”).2 The target rate changes are presented in Table 1. Following Poole et
al. (2002), we call “event days” the days on which the FOMC meets (whether they
change the target or not) and the inter-meeting days on which the target rate was changed.
The FOMC meeting dates are provided in Table 2. 
Tables 1 and 2 about here
The rates reported in Table 1 are on a 360-day basis. Furthermore, in the
calculation of our transparency index, to avoid an artificial reduction in the index, we use
360-day fed funds and Treasury bill rates. For all other analyses in this paper, however,
rates are expressed on a 365-day basis. For the period under consideration, the Fed has
made some transparency-oriented changes. Some of the most representative changes
include: (i) October 19, 1989 when the Fed started the practice of adjusting the funds rate
target by 25 or 50 basis points,3 (ii) February 4, 1994 when the Fed began announcing
policy decisions after each FOMC meeting, (iii) August 19, 1997 when the FOMC started
including a quantitative fed funds target rate in its Directive to the New York Fed
Trading Desk and (iv) May 18, 1999 when the Fed extended its explanations regarding
policy decisions, and started including in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s
view regarding prospective developments (or the policy bias). Furthermore, (v) on
January 19, 2000, the FOMC issued a press statement explaining that it would include a
                                                
1 Rudebusch (1995) also constructed a federal funds target rate series. His series is available for the periods
1974-1979 and 1984-1992. Although Rudebusch’s series has been widely used by researchers, we use the
FOMC Secretariat’s series because it allows us to study the longest consecutive time period. 
2 Alternatively, the series can be found in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website.  
3 According to Poole and Rasche (2003), this practice started in August 1989, however, we will follow
Sarno and Thornton’s (2003) estimation of October 1989, since it is likely that it took the market at least
two months to realize that the FOMC had enacted this practice.  Also note that according to Rudebusch
(1995), the target change occurred on October 18, 1989, not on the 19. Since we work with the Secretariat
series, we will assume that the change started on the 19.
7balance-of-risks sentence in its statements, replacing the previous bias statement.4 The
practice was first implemented in the following FOMC meeting, on February 2. Finally,
(vi) since March 19, 2002 the Fed has included in FOMC statements the vote on the
directive and the names of dissenter members (if any). 5  
We will use our index to determine whether transparency-oriented reforms at the
Fed have indeed increased the market’s understanding of Fed policies. Finally, we will
also test whether monetary policy has been more transparent during Alan Greenspan’s
tenure (August 11, 1987 to the present). 
III. A Money-Market Measure of the Transparency of Fed Policy
Making
In a recent paper Sarno and Thornton (2003) have shown the federal funds and
3-month Treasury bill rates are cointegrated. Furthermore, the adjustment toward the
long-run equilibrium largely occurs through the movements in the federal funds rate
rather than the TB rate. Thornton (2004), moreover, finds that in conducting its monetary
policy the Fed reacts to movements of short-term interest rates by following an “interest-
rate smoothing” policy. Such a policy implies that all target changes are endogenous
responses to economic shocks. 
Other studies [see Thornton (2004) on relevant literature] argue that private
agents drive the interbank rate to the level desired by the Fed. The action of these agents
reflects the Fed’s “open mouth operations”. Under such operations, the Fed announces its
intention and market participants, knowing that the Fed can and will change the fed funds
rate to what monetary authorities intend, react in such a way that the rate moves to what
the Fed intends. Under open market operations, through purchases or sales of securities,
the Fed influences the fed funds rate. In both of these cases, the Fed conducts a
“discretionary” monetary policy to influence the fed funds rate. Then the fed funds rate
changes affect other money market rates. However, under the “interest-rate smoothing”
policy the Fed, by influencing fed funds rate, reacts to movements of short-term interest
rates either to moderate the movements or to lead these rates to a specific direction or
level that the monetary authorities consider desirable. In this case, short-term money
                                                
4 Federal Reserve Board, “Modifications to the FOMC’s Disclosure Procedures” 19 January 2000.
5 For a review of these changes, see Poole and Rasche (2003).
8market rates, which reflect economic conditions and/or market participants’ expectations,
influence the fed funds rate. On these issues, see Thornton (2004) who reports all relevant
literature and analyses clearly all these possibilities. Using the result of the existing
literature we assume that the monetary policy in the United States can be “discretionary”
or “interest-rate smoothing”, or a combination of these two regimes. 
In this section, using the above assumption, we will construct an index of the
transparency of monetary policy. Our index is based on the degree to which money
market participants anticipate the decisions taken at the regularly scheduled FOMC
meetings (whether a target change occurred or not), as well as those (target changes)
enacted outside these meetings. We will first introduce the theoretical justification for our
index and then we will construct both our formal index and an extended version. 
A. A Monetary Policy Index: Theoretical Justification
Suppose full certainty (100% transparency) on monetary policy exists, i.e., the
Fed fully conveys its private information on monetary policy decisions to the market. The
implementation of the monetary policy can be conducted in one or more of the following
ways: remarks of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve as well as other senior
management of the Fed, testimony before the House and Senate Banking Committee, the
release of the Beige book, the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meetings,
changes in reserve requirements, changes in the discount rate and open market
operations. 
Suppose at time t the Fed conducts a “discretionary” monetary policy and tightens
the market by, say, an outright sale of Treasury bills in order to increase the target rate
from FF0 to FF1 at time t+1, the target-change day or the day of the FOMC meeting.
There will be a drain in reserves. Banks compete for the interbank funds and the Federal
funds rate will go up. This will lead to an increase in the Treasury bill-Federal funds rate
differential, Dift (= FFt – TBt). Banks will also sell their Treasury bills or other liquid
assets to obtain the required liquidity and so put a further downward pressure on Treasury
bill prices. Since we assumed full monetary policy transparency, the market participants,
knowing the intention of the Fed, will also sell Treasury bills. These speculative/arbitrage
activities will continue until the interbank and the money markets are again in
9equilibrium at time t+1. At such time, we would expect, when full transparency exists,
Dift+1 and Dift to almost coincide.
The Fed’s action and the subsequent market’s reaction will continue until the next
target-change day or FOMC meeting when the Fed’s desired target rate (FF1) is officially
announced. According to this analysis, one would expect under full monetary policy
transparency, deviations of Dif from its average/trend (say, Tdif) be temporary. In fact,
using the assumption that FF causes TB, we may consider Dif during the transitory
period (between two equilibrium positions) as a measure of the stance of the monetary
policy.
If we assume there is a lack of (less than 100%) monetary policy transparency,
then deviations of Dif from Tdif last longer and may not be temporary. The reason is that
market participants could easily be confused by the action of the Fed and may
overreact/underreact in the right or the opposite direction where the authorities wish the
market to go. This may make the life of the central bankers more difficult and may result
in more activities by the Fed to correct the situation. For example, an outright sale of
Treasury bills by the Fed may be considered a smoothing action by the market and lead
the participants to purchase Treasury bills in order to sell them at a higher price when the
Fed starts buying them back. This will result in widening the deviations of Dif from Tdif.
Consequently, any |Dt| — where Dt = Dift – Tdift-1 — is an indication of the monetary
policy transparency, a small |Dt| means a high transparency and vice versa. 
Note that we are assuming the market is not efficient in a strong form, i.e., the
market participants do not know the Fed’s private information before it is publicized. If
the market is efficient in the strong form, market participants will, on average, perceive
the target rate change in advance, and if there exists potential for arbitrage/speculative
profits arbitrageurs and speculators will trade until potential profits are eliminated.
Namely, arbitrage and speculative activities will eliminate any Dt, which is associated
with potential arbitrage/speculative profits. If the market is not efficient in a strong form,
arbitrageurs and speculators must be given the inside information through Fed’s
signals/operations. 
Let us now assume the Fed is following an “interest-rate smoothing” policy.
Starting from full monetary policy transparency, suppose market participants, due to
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some signals from the Fed and/or some economic shocks which caused movements in the
equilibrium interest rate, expect a positive change in the target rate. A higher expected
rate in the near future creates potential for arbitrage/speculative profits. Profit
maximization leads arbitrageurs/speculators (investors) to operate along the short end of
the yield curve by selling their three-month bills and buying very short-term bills or
lending overnight. This action leads to an increase in TB and a reduction in D. To
moderate the reduction in the overnight rate as well as to confirm its intention, the Fed
will put an upward pressure on non-borrowed reserves by selling bills. The Fed’s action
leads to an upward/downward pressure on FF/TB. Arbitrage and speculative activities as
well as the Fed reactions continue until the money market is again in equilibrium. As
before, one would expect D, under full monetary policy transparency, to approach zero at
equilibrium when potential for arbitrage/speculative profits is eliminated. Clearly, when
monetary policy transparency is low, D is high in absolute value.
In sum, so far, based on the empirical results in literature, we have established
theoretical justification behind our index. Such an index, contrary to the existing market
based indexes in the literature, e.g., Howells and Mariscal (2002), is dynamic and
includes expected policy actions. 
B. Basic Index
We will construct our index in three steps as follows:
(1) We identify “event days” as the days on which the Federal funds target
rate was changed whether at a regularly scheduled FOMC meeting or outside the
meetings (Table 1) and also the days on which the FOMC met but did not change the
target rate. When the FOMC meetings took place over two days we choose the second
day of the meeting as the event day. Our event days can be seen in Table 4, which also
shows our index. 
Our first event date in the sample is October 5, 1982, the first meeting of the
FOMC during our period of study. On this date, the FOMC adopted a target for the
Federal funds rate of 10%. Our second event date is October 8, 1982, when the FOMC
changed the target (to 9.5%) outside a regularly scheduled meeting. Our last event date is
December 9, 2003, the last meeting of the FOMC within our sample period. On this
occasion the Fed left the target rate unchanged. In total, we have 227 event days.
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(2) For each event day, we calculate |Dt| = |Dift - Tdift-1|, where Dift = FFt -TBt
and where Tdift-1 is the average of Dift between two event dates. Namely, we calculate
daily observations of the absolute value of the deviation of FF minus TB from the trend
differential at each event date.6 To further clarify the calculation of the index, we provide
in Table 3 a detailed calculation of |Dt| for three event dates in the sample, i.e.,
i = October 5, 1982, j and i = October 8, 1982 and j = November 16, 1982. Dift is easily
constructed by subtracting TBt from FFt at each date. Tdifj-1 is found as the arithmetic
average of Dift for, e.g., t = 5-Oct-82, 6-Oct-82, 7-Oct-82, is, 
Tdifj-1 = (2.13 + 1.40 + 2.06)/3 =1.863333.
Finally, |Dj| = |Difj - Tdifj-1| = |1.88 - 1.863333| = 0.016667.
(3) We consider the maximum/minimum of |Dt|, at the event dates in the
sample period, to be the least/most transparent over the period, and we calculate the index
as follows:





If |D| = 0%, we will have T = 100%, the highest transparency degree and for
|D| = 10% we will have T = 0.0045% which may be considered zero transparency for the
case of the United States. In sum, under the environment when the Treasury bill market is
not efficient in a strong form, market participants can completely perceive the target rate,
only due to 100% transparency, so that e|D| = 1. Table 4 reports the transparency index for
our sample period. See also Figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here
Tables 3 and 4 about here
For the entire sample, index T averages 83.64%. The maximum value of T is 100
(full transparency or full anticipation) and it occurs on September 26, 1995. The least
transparent outcome (T = 23.42%) occurs early on in the sample on December 16, 1987.
                                                
6 Although it would be more intuitive to calculate Tdif as the daily geometric average (as opposed to the
arithmetic average), about 10 percent of the time Dif is a negative value and often the number of days
between event days is an even number.  Consistent approximations of the geometric average are also not
possible for all dates in the sample. To make the measure consistent across observations we use simple
arithmetic averages.  Another potential problem with geometric averages occurs when the differential is
zero or close to zero, because in such a case the geometric mean artificially drives the trend to zero.
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A fairly low value for T also occurs on September 17, 2001, clearly due to the uncertainty
created by the events of September 2001. 
As explained in Section II, during our sample period there have been policy
regime changes, which, without any doubt, resulted in a higher monetary policy
transparency in the United States. These changes occurred on August 11, 1987,
October 19, 1989, February 4, 1994, August 19, 1997, May 18, 1999, February 2, 2000
and, March 19, 2002. We will use our index to determine whether the above
transparency-oriented changes at the Fed have indeed increased the market’s
understanding of Fed policies. 
Since our basic index, T, has irregular intervals we constructed a quarterly sample
out of the observations. Namely, we took the average of our index in each quarter.
According to both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, variable T is stationary.7
Table 5 reports the means with their standard errors (adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity) of the index before and after each policy regime change. All of the
means are statistically significant. The above policy regime changes resulted in positive
and statistically significant changes in the transparency index. Consequently, according to
these results, the index developed in this paper clearly captures the increase in the
monetary policy transparency created by the above policy regime changes. Namely, the
index developed in this paper fully reflects a transparency index. 
Table 5 about here
C. Extension of the Index
Being a variable with unequal intervals, our basic index can be used in studies
with quarterly or less frequent data. Alternatively, it restricts the researchers to specific
techniques of estimation, such as the factor-model approach which allows researchers to
deal systematically with data irregularities [e.g., Stock and Watson (2002)]. To make the
measure suitable for all kinds of research, using the above methodology and logic, we
extend our index as follows. For the event days, the index is defined exactly as before
[Equation (1)]. For all other days, we compute an estimated or forecasted value of tD ,
                                                
7 The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t was estimated to be 6.77 [more than 2.89 (5%
critical value)] and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t was estimated to be 7.12
[more than 2.89 (5% critical value)]. Both of these tests were done for a lag length of zero (where, for a
global lag of 20 days, the AIC is at its minimum).
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= , where j is the last event day and n is the number of days since the last
event day. Given tDˆ , we calculate an index for non-event days tTˆ ,
t
ˆ|D |
tTˆ 100 / e= . (2)
Note that our index tTˆ  is dynamic and also continuous in the sense that we can
construct it for intraday-minute or even shorter-interval, instead of daily, observations. To
further clarify how the index is constructed on non-event days consider once again the
first two event dates in the sample i = October 5, 1982 and j = October 8, 1982, and






(2.13+1.40)/2 = 1.765. We then compute tDˆ  = | Dift - Adift| = |2.06-1.765| = 0.295, and
0.295
tTˆ 100 / e 74.453159= = . Figure 2 depicts our extended index. Note that for event
days the extended index is given by tT  and for non-event days, by tTˆ . On average, for
the entire sample period, the extended transparency index equals 85.68. See Table 3 for
the extension of the example for the next event date.
Figure 2 about here
We will again investigate, using our daily observations and extended index,
whether the regime changes of August 11, 1987, October 19, 1989, February 4, 1994,
August 19, 1997, May 18, 1999, February 2, 2000, and March 19, 2002 have resulted in
more transparency (as measured by our extended index). According to both
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, our extended index Tˆ  is stationary. 8 Table 5 also
reports the means with their standard errors (adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity) of the daily index before and after each policy regime change. As the
results reported in the table indicate, all means and their changes are positive and
                                                
8 The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t was estimated to be 41.46 (more than 2.86 [5%
critical value)] and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t for the lag length of 4 (where,
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statistically significant, confirming the earlier findings that these policy regime changes
resulted in a higher monetary policy transparency. Furthermore, the results imply that the
daily monetary policy transparency index developed in this paper also fully and clearly
captures the increase in the monetary policy transparency created by the above policy
regime changes. Namely, the daily index developed in this paper also fully reflects a
monetary policy transparency index. 
IV. Risk and Volatility in the Money Market: Further Evaluation of
the Index
It is commonly believed [e.g., Thornton (1996) and Blinder et al. (2001)] that
monetary policy transparency leads to a lower uncertainty and risk in the financial
markets. If our index, both the basic and the extended, is a true proxy for monetary policy
transparency in the United States it should have a negative relationship with the risk
observed in the money market in the country. This section is devoted to such an
investigation. We will first test if the index has a negative impact on the risk in the money
market. We will conduct this test by using the rational expectations model of the term
structure. The test is based on the idea that the more the Fed conveys its private
information to the market the higher the forecast ability of the market participants will be
and, consequently, they will demand a lower risk premium. We then test if our index has
any impact on the volatility in the money market in the United States. This test is based
on the idea that a higher volatility of the return in the money market is associated with a
higher risk in the market and, therefore, if a more transparent monetary policy results in a
lower volatility it will help to reduce risk in the money market. 
A. Risk in the Money Market and the Index
The pure (rational) expectations model of the term structure (RE), in which the
term premia are set identically to zero, implies that at any moment in time, the expected
TB, for example, prevailing at the beginning of three months from now (1+3TBte) should
be equal to the implied forward three-month Treasury bill rate (FTBt) in the absence of
term premium or any other risk. From the first statement of the theory [e.g., Van Horne
(1965)], we know that FTBt = [(1 + TB6t/4)2/(1 + TBt/4)] – 1. Here TB6 is the six-month
                                                                                                                                                
for a global lag of 20 days, the AIC is at its minimum) was estimated to be 42.32 [more than 2.86 (5%
critical value)].
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spot rate and we assume both six- and three-month spot Treasury bill rates are at the
annual rate. Specifically, we can write:
1+3TBte = FTBt. (3)
If this equality is violated, investors and speculators, trade three- and six-month
Treasury bills, to capture potential arbitrage profits, until Equation (3) is restored. For
example, if 1+3TBte > FTBt speculators will sell their six-month bills and buy three-month
bills, pushing the price of six-month bills down (TB6t will go up) and increasing the price
of three-month bills up (TB3t will go down). This speculative activity continues until the
potential for arbitrage profits is eliminated, i.e., 1+3TBte is again equal to FTBt.
Furthermore, by orthogonal decomposition at any given time t we have:
TBt = TBte + Vt, (4)
where Vt is the agents’ forecast error in the absence of transaction costs, risk and other
premia (including term premium, liquidity premium and reinvestment premium).
Substituting (3) in (4) yields:
TBt+1 = FTBt + Vt+1. (5)
If the market is efficient (expectations are rational), TBt+1 - FTBt = Vt+1 is stationary [e.g.,
Campbell and Shiller (1987)] and, in the absence of risk premia and transaction costs, has
a zero mean. The error term (Vt) is stationary as both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron
tests reject the null hypothesis that Vt is not stationary. The absolute value of the
augmented Dickey Fuller t was estimated to be 6.87 and the absolute value of the
Phillips-Perron non-parametric t for the lag length of 4 was estimated to be 7.20, both
t statistic results are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value).9 However, the mean of Vt over
our sample period was found to be -0.2956%, at the annual rate, with an autocorrelated-
heteroscedastic adjusted t statistic of -17.73.10 The mean of the absolute value of V was
found to be 0.4216%, at the annual rate, with an autocorrelated-heteroscedastic adjusted
t statistic of 31.392. Both of these means are far from being zero, indicating term
premium or other risk premia exist, assuming a trivial transaction cost. Although a
completely different approach was used, this result (i.e., on average, the RE hypothesis is
                                                
9 In this paper the lag length in augmented Dicky-Fuller or Phillips-Perron nonparametric tests was
obtained according to Akaike’s AIC and/or Schwarz’s SC criteria, where for a global lag of 20 days the
AIC and/or SC are/is at their/its minimum.
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valid in the United States money market, and risk premia exist) is consistent, among
many others, with the finding of Van Horne (1965), Mankiw and Miron (1986) and
Taylor (1992). 
We will, consequently, modify Equation (5) to 
TBt+1 = FTBt + RPt+1 + Vt+1 = FTBt + Wt+1, (6)
where RP is risk premia and Wt = RPt + Vt. Note that RP includes term, liquidity, interest
exposure and reinvestment risk premia where reinvestment risk premium has a negative
effect on RP. If our index is a satisfactory representative of the monetary policy
transparency in the United States it should have a negative relationship with Wt in
Equation (6), see Thornton (1996), Haldane and Read (2000) and Blinder et al. (2001),
among others, for arguments and econometric tests on the relationship between
transparency and forecast errors of market participants. 
We estimate the following equation:
tW  = ξ0 + ξ1LTt-1 + DUMt-1’ ς + Єt, (7)
where tW  is the absolute value of the forecast error from Equation (6), LTt is the
logarithm of tTˆ , ξ’s are constant parameters, ς is a vector of constant parameters and Єt is
the white noise disturbance term. Vector DUM is included in the equation in order to
capture the impact of monetary policy regime changes as well as other shocks on the risk
premia, where, DUM = (Mt, Tt, WEDt, THt, D851231t, D861231t, GREENt, OCT87t,
ASIAt, TAt, TAFt, SWEDt, REMAt, D940418t, D970819t, D981015t, D99518t, D000202t,
D010103t, D010418t, D010917t, D020319t, EDAYt, TARATEt).
Mt, Tt, WEDt and THt are dummy variables for Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays
and Thursdays, respectively. For example, M = 1 for Mondays and zero, otherwise.
Dummy variables D851231t and D861231t are equal to one on December 30 and 31,
1985 and December 31, 1986, respectively, and are equal to zero, otherwise. These
dummy variables are included to capture the high volatility of fed funds rate on those
days. Dummy variable GREENt =1 since August 11, 1987 when Alan Greenspan was
appointed chair of the Fed and is zero, otherwise. OCT87t and ASIAt are dummy
                                                                                                                                                
10  Autocorrelation is due to the overlapping observations. We used, as before, the Newey and West’s
(1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average to correct the standard error.
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variables accounting for the October 87 and Asian crises, respectively. In both events,
central banks in the industrial countries flooded the money markets with liquidity to ease
the downfall in the stock markets. The easing of the markets took at least until the end of
October of the year the crisis took place. 
Consequently, we created OCT87t = 1 for October 19 to 30, 1987 and zero,
otherwise, and ASIAt = 1 for October 17 to 30, 1997 and zero, otherwise. Dummy
variable TAt = 1 since February 4, 1994 and is equal to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable
TAFt = 1 since October 19, 1989 and is zero, otherwise. These two dummy variables
were created to account for the two policy regime changes, which have happened in the
sample period as explained before. Dummy variable SWEDt accounts for settlement days
on Wednesdays, i.e., it is equal to one on Wednesdays when it was a settlement day and
zero, otherwise. Dummy variable REMAt = 1 since February 2, 1984 when the reserve
maintenance period was modified from one week (for most large institutions) to two
weeks (for all institutions) and is zero, otherwise.
Dummy variable D970819t =1 since August 19, 1997, when the FOMC started
including a quantitative fed funds target rate in its Directive to the New York Fed
Trading Desk, and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable D99518t =1 since May 18, 1999,
when the Fed extended its explanations regarding policy decisions, and started including
in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective
developments (or the policy bias), and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable D000202t = 1
since February 2, 2000, when the FOMC started to include a balance-of-risks sentence in
its statements replacing the previous bias statement, and zero, otherwise. Dummy
variable D020319t = 1 since March 19, 2002, when the Fed included in FOMC
statements the vote on the directive and the names of dissenter members (if any), and
zero, otherwise.
Dummy variables D940418t, D981015t, D010103t, D010418t and D010917t are
equal to one for April 18, 1994; October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001; April 18, 2001 and
September 17, 2001 (when the Fed changed the FF target outside their regular meetings),
respectively, and zero otherwise. Dummy variable EDAYt is equal to one for the days
(“event”) when the federal funds target rate was changed whether at a regularly
scheduled FOMC meeting, or otherwise (reported in Table 1), and also for the days on
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which the FOMC met, but did not change the target rate. It is equal to zero, otherwise.
Dummy variable TARATE is equal to one for the days when the federal funds target rate
actually was changed (Table 1) and is equal to zero, otherwise. These days can be among
the regularly scheduled FOMC meeting dates or other days. Note that TARATE is a
subset of EDAY, as it excludes the days when FOMC met, but did not change the target.
Note that we also assume the forecast error may be different in the “event” days and days
when the target rate was changed.
Note that variables LT and DUM enter in Equation (7) with one lag length (three
months ago) since the implied forward rate was used three months before (at the time of
forecast) the actual rate was realized. Our index, if it is a real proxy for monetary
transparency in the United States, should have a negative relationship with the risk
premia if the estimated ξ1 is negative and statistically significant. Since our sample is
daily observations, LT is our extended index and the lag length is 90 days. Equation (8) is
the parsimonious estimated result of Equation (7), where the figures in brackets are
standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
tW  = 1.03 (0.21) - 0.12 (0.04) LTt-1 - 0.13 (0.02) TAt-1 + 0.15 (0.07) REMAt-1
-0.19 (0.05) GREENt-1+ 0.51 (0.03) D010917t-1 + 0.39 (0.01) D010103t-1 
+ 0.15 (0.01) D940418t-1+ 0.57 (0.15) OCT87t-1 -0.52 (0.25) D851231t-1, 
-1.56 (0.38) D861231t-1, (8)
R 2=0.09, σ=0.39, RESET=0.20 (significance level=0.90).
The estimated coefficient of LT is negative and statistically significant implying
that as the monetary policy is more transparent the forecast errors and risk premia will
fall. This result confirms the views and findings of several authors, including Thornton
(1996), Haldane and Read (2000) and Blinder et al. (2001). According to the estimated
coefficient of dummy variable TA, the Fed policy of changing FF rate at regular FOMC
meetings resulted in a lower risk and forecast error in the money market in the United
States. 
The positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient of REMA implies
that modifying the reserve maintenance period from one week (for most large
institutions) to two weeks (for all institutions) in February 1984 resulted in a higher
forecast error, while the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the dummy
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variable GREEN means the forecast error in the money market fell during the tenure of
Chairman Greenspan in the United States. The estimated coefficient of D010917, as one
would expect, is positive and statistically significant, which reflects a higher risk
environment associated with September 2001.
Furthermore, as the positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient of
D010103 and OCT87 indicates, the unexpected change in the target rate on
January 3, 2001 and during the October 87 stock crisis resulted in a higher forecast error.
However, according to the estimated coefficient of dummy variable D940418, which is
negative, the forecast error (and/or risk premia) fell on April 18, 1994 when the Fed
changed the FF target outside the regular meetings. The surprising result is the estimated
coefficients of dummy variables D851231 and D861231. Both are negative and
statistically significant implying a high volatility of FF on December 31, 1985 and
December 30 and 31, 1986 resulted in a lower forecast error on those days.
We also used quarterly averages of the daily observations to create a quarterly
sample to test the power of our basic index T. For quarterly observations of T, we also
took the average of our index in each quarter. We adjusted Equation (7) for relevant
quarterly dummy variables and used the least squared estimation technique to estimate
the equation with our quarterly data. In the first round of regression, among dummy
variables, only REMA was statistically significant. After dropping dummy variables with
statistically insignificant coefficients we found the coefficient of dummy variable REMA
to be statistically insignificant. We, consequently, dropped this dummy variable from the
regression. The parsimonious estimated Equation (7) with LT being the logarithm of our
quarterly index is as follows: 
tW  = 7.87 (2.41) -1.68 (0.54) LTt-1, (9)
R 2=0.09, σ=0.33, DW=1.69, Godfrey(5)=0.85 (significance level=0.53),
White=2.78 (significance level=0.73), ARCH(5)=3.10 (significance level=0.68),
RESET=0.10 (significance level=0.95).
According to the Godfrey test result, the error term is not autocorrelated and as
White and ARCH test results indicate it is also homoscedastic. According to the RESET
test result, there is no misspecification. The negative and statistically significant
coefficient of LT clearly confirms the earlier finding in this paper that a higher monetary
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policy transparency leads to a lower forecast error (a higher efficiency in the money
market). 
B. Volatility in the Money Market and the Index
To further investigate the strength of our transparency index we will examine the
relationship between our index and risk, measured by the volatility, in the money market.
It is important to note that theoretically speaking the impact of transparency on volatility
is arguable. For example, in a 1976 Freedom of Information Act filing, the Fed argued in
favor of secrecy motivated by its desire to reduce interest rate variability [see Goodfriend
(1986)]. This view is consistent with the literature [see, e.g., Dotsey (1987)] that argues
that the cleaner and more frequent the “signal” (or the more transparent monetary policy)
is the larger the responsiveness of interest rates to news will be, and thus the greater their
volatility is.
Another strand of the literature, however, argues that more transparency tends to
reduce market volatility. Tabellini (1987), for example, shows that when market
participants face parameter uncertainty (or multiplicative uncertainty) and learn over
time, using Bayes’ rule, the learning process is the source of additional volatility in asset
prices. In this case, more transparency tends to reduce market volatility. Since recent
empirical evidence suggests that the 1994 transparency move by the Fed is not associated
with higher market volatility [e.g., Rafferty and Tomljanovich (2001) and Thornton
(1996)], we will follow Tabellini (1987) and assume a more transparent monetary policy
tends to lower volatility.
Volatility Model
According to the existing literature [e.g., Sarno and Thornton (2003) and
Thornton  (2004)] FF and TB are cointegrated. Hence, we would expect the volatility of
the daily movements in FF, say VFF, be directly related to the volatility of the daily
movements in TB, say VTB, (i.e., the risk in the money market).11 Furthermore, Ho and
Saunders (1985) rationalize the determination of the fed funds rate in the context of a
theoretical micro model. They show that, under the condition of managerial risk aversion,
the variance of FF, among other factors, is a positive function of the variance of the rate
on short-term securities, say three-month Treasury bill rate, and the variance of the sum
                                                
11 The reverse, of course, is also true.
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of the individual bank excess reserve positions. Moreover, the variance of FF is a
negative function of the covariance between the short-term rate and the sum of the
individual bank excess reserve positions (ER) [see, Ho and Saunders (1985), Equation
(22), p. 985]. In an implicit form we may write Ho and Saunders’ Equation (22) as:
Var(FF)t = F(Var(TB)t, Var(ER)t, Cov(TB and ER)t, Zt, et) (10)
where FVar(TB) > 0, FVar(ER) > 0, FCov(TB and ER) < 0, FZ > 0 and Fe > 0. FVar(TB), FVar(ER),
FCov(TB and ER), FZ and Fe  are partial derivatives of Var(FF) in terms of Var(TB), Var(ER),
Cov(TB and ER), Z, and e, respectively. Z is a measure of risk aversion and e is the slope
of reserve adjustment opportunity curve. Note that since Cov(TB and ER) is negative it
also affects the variance of FF positively. The more negative this covariance is, the
greater the positive effect it has on the variance of the funds rate.
We extend Ho and Saunders’ model to develop a model capable to relate the impact
of monetary policy transparency on the volatility of the fed funds market. Define ρTB, ER
as the correlation coefficient between TB and ER and SD(TB) as well as SD(ER) as
standard deviation of TB and ER, respectively. We know that Cov(TB and ER) = ρTB, ER
SD(TB) SD(ER). Let us substitute for Cov(TB and ER) in (10) to get:
Var(FF)t = F(Var(TB)t, Var(ER)t, ρTB, ER SD(TB)t SD(ER)t, Zt, et) (11)
Furthermore, assume the correlation coefficient between TB and ER is constant and
Z and e are a function of monetary policy transparency as well as all domestic and
foreign shocks. We may assume a linear approximation of Equation (11) as: 
VFFt = Γ0 + ∑Γk
1=i
i-ti VTB + ∑Φk
1=i
i-ti VER  + EDUM t’Γ + γ LTt + εt, (12)
where VER is the volatility of the growth of ER, Γ0,...,Γk , Φ0,..., Φk and Γ are constant
parameters. The disturbance term εt is assumed to be normally, identically and
independently distributed. Dummy vector EDUM = (DUMt, STUt, TUE1t, HBt, HA1t,
HB3t, HA3t, LDYt, LQBAt, LQt). Dummy variables included in DUM were defined
before. To capture the possible volatility in the fed funds rate created by other factors,
like window dressing, holidays and other seasonality, following Hamilton (1996), we
included dummy variables STUt, TUE1t, HB1t, HA1t, HB3t, HA3t, LDYt, LDBYAt,
LQBAt and LQt.
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These dummy variables are defined as: STU = 1 on Tuesdays before settlement
Wednesdays and zero, otherwise. TUE1 = 1 on Tuesdays before settlement Wednesdays
if Wednesday was a holiday, and = 0, otherwise. HB1 = 1 for the day before a one-day
holiday, and = 0, otherwise. HA1 = 1 for the day after a one-day holiday, and = 0,
otherwise. HB3 = 1 for the day before a three-day holiday, and = 0, otherwise. HA3 = 1
for the day after a three-day holiday, and = 0, otherwise. LDY =1 for the last days of the
year, and = 0, otherwise. LDBYA = 1 for 2 days before, 1 day before, on, 1 day after, or
2 days after the end of the year, and = 0, otherwise. LQBA = 1 for the day before, on, or
after the last day of the first, second and third quarters, and = 0, otherwise. And finally,
LQ = 1 for the last day of the first, second, third and fourth quarters, and = 0, otherwise. 
Note that in (12) both VTB and VER are predetermined and if γ is negative then the
higher the monetary policy transparency (LT) is the lower the volatility in the fed funds
market will be. Following, among many, Schwert (1989), Kearney (2000) as well as
Kia (2003b), the methodology developed by Davidian and Carroll (1978) was used. Let x
be any variable in column vector xt = (∆TBt, ∆FFt, GERt)’, where GER is the growth rate
of the excess reserves of depository institutions in the United States, and estimate





i x  + EDUMt’µx + uxt,  uxt ~niid(0, Σ) (13)
The parameters αx’s and vector µx are assumed to be constant. We assume a lag length of
20 days (reflecting a month) is sufficient for the market participants to learn from the past
                                                
12 For the variable TB, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 5) is
0.0910 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is
0.56884. Both t statistics are less than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that TB has one unit root. For the
variable ∆TB, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 27.74
and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 62.19. Both
t statistics are more than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that ∆TB is stationary. For the variable FF, the
absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 10) is 0.5484 and the absolute
value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 1.57231. Both t statistics
again are less than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that FF also has a unit root. For the variable ∆FF, the
absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 9) is 25.21 and the absolute
value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 86.86. Both t statistics are
more than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that ∆FF is stationary. For the variable GER, the absolute
value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of zero) is 75.18 and the absolute value of
the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 75.19. Both t statistics are more than
2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that GER is stationary. Note that the lag length in all of these tests was
chosen according to the minimum of AIC and BIC.
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movements in the TB rate. The dummy variables included in vector EDUM capture the
shocks on the rate during our sample period. Furthermore, a 20th-order autoregression for
the absolute values of errors from Equation (13), including dummy variables in vector
EDUM that allow for different daily standard deviations (adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation), should be estimated:






x + vt, (14)
where xiδ , for i = 1 to 20 and the column vector ηx are constant parameters. The absolute
value of the fitted value of uxt (i.e., |ûxt |) is the standard deviation (adjusted
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) of xt, for xt  = ∆TBt, ∆FFt and GERt. However,
since the expected error is lower than the standard deviation from a normal distribution,
following Schwert (1989), all absolute errors are multiplied by the constant 1.2533.
As it was also mentioned by Kia (2003b), the conditional volatility in Equation (14)
represents a generalization of the 20-day rolling standard estimator used by
Officer (1973), Fama (1976) and Merton (1980). This is due to the fact that the
conditional volatility estimated by Equation (14) allows the conditional mean to vary
over time in Equation (13), while it also allows different weights to be applied to the
lagged absolute unpredicted changes in Treasury bills and fed funds rates as well as the
daily growth of the sum of the individual bank excess reserve positions. 
Note that here the conditional mean of these rates was also allowed to vary with the
shocks represented by dummy variables included in vector EDUM. Furthermore,
Engle (1993) reviews the merit of this measure of volatility, among others. This measure
of volatility is similar to the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model
of Engle (1982), which, in its various forms, has been widely used in the finance
literature. Davidian and Carroll (1978) argue that the specification in Equation (14) based
on the absolute value of the prediction errors is more robust than those based on the
squared residuals in Equation (13). 
However, it should be noted that the dependent variables of equations (12) and (14)
are generated regressors. Consequently, when the equations are estimated, their t statistic
should be interpreted with caution. To cope with this problem, following, among many,
Kearney (2000) and Kia (2003b), the equation for the conditional volatility [i.e.,
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Equation (12)] is estimated jointly with the equations determining the conditional
volatilities of ∆TB, ∆FF and GER using the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation
procedure (SUR).13
In the GLS system, three equations are generated by Equation (13), three equations
are generated by Equation (14) and including Equation (12) a system of seven equations
with 5,308 observations (with a final 3,644 usable observations) is estimated. In the GLS
estimation, for each equation and the system of equations, we used the Newey and
West (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average to correct for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. The GLS estimator incorporates the possibility of cross-equation
correlation among the error terms. The final parsimonious GLS estimation result of
Equation (12), where standard errors, corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity,
are in brackets, is given in the second column of Table 6.14
Table 6 about here
According to the negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient of LT
we can conclude again that a higher monetary policy transparency leads to a lower
volatility in the money (fed funds) market. Namely, our index fully reflects monetary
policy transparency in the United States. None of the coefficients of VTB, except VTBt-2,
was statistically significant and so they were dropped in the final estimation.
Consequently, the volatility of TB affects VFF only after two days, but it has a wrong
sign (negative). One possible explanation for this negative estimated coefficient is that
while these rates do move together within a few hours apart it takes about two days for
bills to be delivered (there are 24 to 48 hours between transaction and settlement dates). It
is possible a high volatility in TB on the transaction date leads to a lower volatility in FF
on the settlement date when the associated banker acceptances are matured. 
                                                
13  See Kia (2003b), Footnote 4, for a full explanation on why in our case the GLS estimation technique
should be used.
14 The stationarity test results for VTB are as follows: The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t,
for a lag length of 8 = 11.07 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t test for the lag
length 3 = 52.04, both t statistics are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value) indicating the conditional
volatility VTB is stationary. The stationarity test results for VFF are as follows: The absolute value of the
augmented Dickey Fuller t, for a lag length of 9 = 15.42 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron
non-parametric t-test for the lag length 10 = 49.49, both t statistics are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value)
indicating the conditional volatility VFF is stationary. The stationarity test results for VER are as follows:
The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t is equal to 70.75 and the absolute value of the
25
Furthermore, the volatility of fed fund rates is strongly affected by the volatility in
the sum of the individual bank excess reserve positions as the coefficients of VER up to
twenty business days are statistically significant and mostly positive. Among all dummy
variables, only the coefficient of D940418 is found to be statistically significant. The sign
of this coefficient is negative indicating that when the Fed changed the fed funds target
rate outside its regular meeting on April 18, 1994 it helped in fact to reduce the volatility
in the interbank market.
To use the actual rather than the generated data of the excess reserves of the
depository institutions in order to investigate the usefulness of our index, we constructed
a monthly series from our basic index by averaging the observations in each month. For
those few months with no observation available we used the average value of the index
for the previous month and the month after. For FF and TB, we also used the average of
all observations in the month and used our monthly ER observations. We again estimated
the system of seven equations, using a two-month lag length, with all appropriate dummy
variables reflecting policy and other shocks as well as monthly dummy variables, with
241 usable observations. The final parsimonious GLS estimation result of Equation (12),
with monthly observations is given in the third column of Table 6. 
Dummy variables March, May and August are dummy variables equal to 1 for the
months of March, May and August, respectively, and zero, otherwise. As we can see
again the estimated coefficient of our index is negative and statistically significant,
confirming earlier results. However, we found neither the coefficient of VTB nor the
coefficient of VER was statistically significant at a conventional level and so both were
dropped from the regression. Interestingly, the volatility of fed funds market is lower
during the months of March, May and August and it fell since March 19, 2002 when the
Fed included in the FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the names of
dissenter members (if any). Caution should, however, be exercised with the estimation
results with monthly observations. The reason is that in the first round of GLS we
simultaneously estimated seven equations with more than 100 coefficients by using only
241 observations. Consequently, the test inferences may be unreliable.
                                                                                                                                                
Phillips-Perron non-parametric t-test for the lag length 4 = 70.76, both t statistics are higher than 2.86 (5%
critical value) indicating the conditional volatility VER is stationary.
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We further investigate the usefulness of our index in capturing the impact of
monetary policy transparency on the volatility of money markets. We will use the
empirical results of Sarno and Thornton  (2003) and Thornton  (2004) and assume the
volatility of TB is a function of the volatility of FF and policy regime changes as well as
other shocks specified in EDUM. We assume such a relationship has a linear
approximation as specified by Equation (15):
VTBt = Γ0 + ∑Γk
1=i
i-ti VFF +  EDUM t’Γ + γ LTt + εt (15)
We will estimate, as before, a system of equations (13), (14) and (15) using the
GLS estimation technique (SUR). In this exercise two equations are generated by
Equation (13), two equations are generated by Equation (14) and including Equation (15)
a system of five equations with 5,308 observations (with a final 5,034 usable
observations) is estimated. As before, for each equation and the system of equations, we
used the Newey and West (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average to correct for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The final parsimonious GLS estimation result of
Equation (15) where standard errors, corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity,
are in brackets, is given in the last column of Table (6).
Among all dummy variables included in EDUM, the coefficients of dummy
variables GREEN, TAF, ASIA, D851231, D861231, D940418, D000202, D010103,
D010418 and D010917 were found to be statistically significant. As the negative
coefficient of dummy variable GREEN indicates during the tenure of Chairman
Greenspan the volatility and risk in the money market fell. As it would be expected, the
estimated coefficient of TAF is negative, implying that the Fed’s change of policy regime
in October 1989 led to a lower volatility in the money market in the United States. This
result confirms the earlier finding in this paper.
As it would be expected, the estimated sign of dummy variable ASIA was
negative, reflecting the massive intervention of all industrial countries’ central banks in
money markets. The estimated coefficient of dummy variables D851231 and D861231 is
negative implying that the outliers in the fed funds rate in the last days of 1985 and 1986
resulted in a lower volatility in the Treasury bill rate. The estimated coefficient of
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D940418 is negative implying that when the Fed changed FF target outside the regular
meetings resulted in a lower volatility in the money market.
According to estimated negative coefficients of dummy variable D000202 when
the FOMC started to include a balance-of-risks sentence in its statements replacing the
previous bias statement it led to a reduction in the volatility in the money market.
According to estimated negative coefficients of dummy variables D010103, D010418
and D010917, a 50 basis point reduction in the target rate on January 3, April 18 and
September 17, 2001 reduced the volatility in the money market. Finally, the estimated
coefficient of our monetary policy index is negative, indicating that a more transparent
monetary policy leads to a lower volatile money market. This result confirms the view of
researchers, e.g., Tabellini (1987), who believe a higher degree of transparency tends to
lower market volatility. 
In sum, we showed in this section the monetary policy transparency indexes
developed in this paper can be used successfully to detect the impact of monetary policy
transparency on risk and volatility. 
V. Summary and Conclusions
The existing measures of monetary policy transparency include indicators based
on descriptive accounts, surveys, official documents and information as well as market
interest rates. However, these measures have some limitations, such as a lack of an
objectively designed index or indexes without time-series properties. In this paper, we
developed an objective market-based index, which is dynamic and continuous and can be
used to measure monetary policy transparency for a country or, simultaneously, a series
of countries, using time-series as well as cross-sectional data.
We developed our index for the United States monetary policy for the period
October 1982-December 2003. Furthermore, we found, using our index, that the more
transparent the monetary policy in the United States is, the less risky and volatile the
money market will be. Moreover, the rational expectations model of the term structure is
valid in the United States money market, but risk premia in this market exist.
Using our constructed index, we found a negative relationship between monetary
policy transparency and risk and volatility in the economy. Furthermore, risk and
uncertainty in money market fell in the United States during the tenure of Chairman
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Greenspan. Moreover, the Fed policy of changing fed funds target rate at regular FOMC
meetings resulted in a lower risk and forecast error in the money market. We also found
that the Fed’s change of policy regime in October 1989, when the Fed started the practice
of changing the fed funds target rates by multiples of 25 or 50 basis points, led to a lower
volatility in the money market. Finally, we conclude that the practice of a more
transparent monetary policy leads to more stability and lower risk in the financial
markets.
One possible extension of this study is to use the index developed in this paper to
investigate if a more transparent monetary policy leads to higher economic growth. Even
though the Federal Reserve became officially transparent only recently, it would also be
interesting to do the same exercise for the period starting when the Federal Reserve was
first established. Finally, it would also be interesting to extend this line of research by
comparing the power of different time-series market-based measures of monetary policy
transparency, including our index and the popular policy surprise measures based on
federal funds futures data.
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Table 1: Federal Funds Target Rate Changes 
DATE TARGET DATE TARGET
5-Oct-82 10 19-Dec-89 8.25
8-Oct-82 9.5 13-Jul-90 8
19-Nov-82 9 29-Oct-90 7.75
14-Dec-82 8.5 13-Nov-90 7.5
24-May-83 8.5-8.75 7-Dec-90 7.25
23-Jun-83 9 or slightly higher 18-Dec-90 7
13-Jul-83 9 or somewhat higher (9-9.5) 9-Jan-91 6.75
4-Oct-83 9.25-9.5 1-Feb-91 6.25
27-Mar-84 10-10.5 8-Mar-91 6
17-Jul-84 11.25 30-Apr-91 5.75
2-Oct-84 10.5-10.625 6-Aug-91 5.5
7-Nov-84 9.5 13-Sep-91 5.25
21-Nov-84 9 31-Oct-91 5
18-Dec-84 8-8.5 6-Nov-91 4.75
13-Feb-85 8.25-8.5 6-Dec-91 4.5
21-Feb-85 8.5 20-Dec-91 4
18-Apr-85 8.25 9-Apr-92 3.75
17-May-85 7.75 2-Jul-92 3.25
1-Aug-85 7.75 or a shade higher 4-Sep-92 3
6-Sep-85 8 4-Feb-94 3.25
17-Dec-85 7.75 22-Mar-94 3.5
7-Mar-86 7.25 or a shade higher 18-Apr-94 3.75
18-Apr-86 6.75 or slightly higher 17-May-94 4.25
5-Jun-86 6.875 16-Aug-94 4.75
10-Jul-86 6.375 15-Nov-94 5.5
14-Aug-86 6.25-6.375 1-Feb-95 6
20-Aug-86 5.875 6-Jul-95 5.75
15-Jan-87 6 19-Dec-95 5.5
30-Apr-87 6.5 or somewhat higher 31-Jan-96 5.25
19-May-87 6.75 or somewhat lower 25-Mar-97 5.5
3-Sep-87 6.75-7 29-Sep-98 5.25
4-Sep-87 7.25 15-Oct-98 5
22-Sep-87 7.375 17-Nov-98 4.75
23-Oct-87 7 30-Jun-99 5
28-Oct-87 6.75-6.875 24-Aug-99 5.25
28-Jan-88 6.5-6.75 16-Nov-99 5.5
10-Feb-88 6.5 2-Feb-00 5.75
29-Mar-88 6.75 21-Mar-00 6
7-May-88 7 16-May-00 6.5
25-May-88 7.25 3-Jan-01 6
22-Jun-88 7.5 31-Jan-01 5.5
9-Aug-88 8-8.25 20-Mar-01 5
22-Nov-88 8.375 18-Apr-01 4.5
14-Dec-88 8.625-8.75 15-May-01 4
Early 01/89 8.875-9 27-Jun-01 3.75
14-Feb-89 9-9.125 21-Aug-01 3.5
24-Feb-89 9.75-9.875 17-Sep-01 3
6-Jun-89 9.5-9.625 2-Oct-01 2.5
6-Jul-89 9.25 6-Nov-01 2
27-Jul-89 9 11-Dec-01 1.75
19-Oct-89 8.75 6-Nov-02 1.25
6-Nov-89 8.5 25-Jun-03 1
Source: for 1982-1989 – FOMC Secretariat and for 1990-2003 – Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Note: When constructing the index we assumed that the target change of 7-May-88 (Saturday)
took place on 9-May-88, and we assumed that the target change of “Early 01/89” took place on
5-Jan-89.
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Table 2: FOMC Meeting Dates (1982-2003)
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
February 1-2 February 10-11 February 4-5 February 4-5 January 29-30
March 29-30 March 31 March 31 March 25 March 19
May 18 May 19 May 19 May 20 May 7
June 30-July 1 July 7 June 30-July 1 July 1-2 June 25-26
August 24 August 18 August 18 August 19 August 13
October 5 September 22 October 6 September 30 September 24
November 16 November 3 November 17 November 12 November 6
December 20-21 December 15-16 December 22 December 16 December 10
1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
February 8-9 February 9-10 February 2-3 February 3-4 January 28-29
March 28-29 March 29 March 23 March 31 March 18
May 24 May 17 May 18 May 19 May 6
July 12-13 June 29-30 July 6-7 June 30-July 1 June 24-25
August 23 August 16 August 17 August 18 August 12
October 4 September 20 September 21 September 29 September 16
November 14-15 November 1 November 16 November 17 October 28
December 19-20 December 13-14 December 21 December 22 December 9
1984 1989 1994 1999
January 30-31 February 7-8 February 3-4 February 2-3
March 26-27 March 28 March 22 March 30
May 21-22 May 16 May 17 May 18
July 16-17 July 5-6 July 5-6 June 29-30
August 21 August 22 August 16 August 24
October 2 October 3 September 27 October 5
November 7 November 14 November 15 November 16
December 17-18 December 18-19 December 20 December 21
1985 1990 1995 2000
February 12-13 February 6-7 January 31-February 1 February 1-2
March 26 March 27 March 28 March 21
May 21 May 15 May 23 May 16
July 9-10 July 2-3 July 5-6 June 27-28
August 20 August 21 August 22 August 22
October 1 October 2 September 26 October 3
November 4-5 November 13 November 15 November 15
December 16-17 December 18 December 19 December 19
1986 1991 1996 2001
February 11-12 February 5-6 January 30-31 January 30-31
April 1 March 26 March 26 March 20
May 20 May 14 May 21 May 15
July 8-9 July 2-3 July 2-3 June 26-27
August 19 August 20 August 20 August 21
September 23 October 1 September 24 October 2
November 5 November 5 November 13 November 6
December 15-16 December 17 December 17 December 11
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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TABLE 3: Basic and Extended Index Methodology*
General Information Basic Index Extended Index
DATE TBt FFt Dift Tdift |Dt| Tt Adift** | Dˆ t| Tˆ t
5-Oct-82 8.14 10.27 2.13   NA NA NA
6-Oct-82 8.05 9.45 1.40   2.130000 0.730000 48.191
7-Oct-82 7.76 9.82 2.06 1.863333  1.765000 0.295000 74.453
8-Oct-82 7.75 9.63 1.88  0.016667 98.347 1.863333 0.016667 98.347
12-Oct-82 7.38 9.20 1.82   1.880000 0.060000 94.176
13-Oct-82 7.42 9.69 2.27   1.850000 0.420000 65.705
14-Oct-82 7.54 9.57 2.03   1.990000 0.040000 96.079
15-Oct-82 7.56 9.43 1.87   2.000000 0.130000 87.810
18-Oct-82 7.43 9.59 2.16   1.974000 0.186000 83.027
19-Oct-82 7.48 9.42 1.94   2.005000 0.065000 93.707
20-Oct-82 7.56 9.81 2.25   1.995714 0.254286 77.547
21-Oct-82 7.57 9.49 1.92   2.027500 0.107500 89.808
22-Oct-82 7.64 9.42 1.78   2.015556 0.235556 79.013
25-Oct-82 7.87 9.55 1.68   1.992000 0.312000 73.198
26-Oct-82 7.96 9.40 1.44   1.963636 0.523636 59.236
27-Oct-82 8.00 9.41 1.41   1.920000 0.510000 60.050
28-Oct-82 7.91 9.44 1.53   1.880769 0.350769 70.415
29-Oct-82 7.90 9.41 1.51   1.855714 0.345714 70.771
1-Nov-82 7.81 9.43 1.62   1.832667 0.212667 80.843
3-Nov-82 7.79 9.68 1.89   1.819375 0.070625 93.181
4-Nov-82 7.73 9.55 1.82   1.823529 0.003529 99.648
5-Nov-82 7.78 9.40 1.62   1.823333 0.203333 81.601
8-Nov-82 7.92 9.45 1.53   1.812632 0.282632 75.380
9-Nov-82 8.00 9.31 1.31   1.798500 0.488500 61.355
10-Nov-82 8.08 9.64 1.56   1.775238 0.215238 80.635
12-Nov-82 8.28 9.61 1.33   1.765455 0.435455 64.697
15-Nov-82 8.43 9.82 1.39 1.731667  1.746522 0.356522 70.011
16-Nov-82 8.40 9.56 1.16  0.571667 56.458 1.731667 0.571667 56.458
* Event days are in bold.
** Note that on an event day Adift equals Tdift-1.
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Table 4: Transparency Index
Date Index Date Index Date Index Date Index
5-Oct-82 na 18-Aug-87 84.254 20-Aug-91 94.082 19-Aug-97 92.648
8-Oct-82 98.347 3-Sep-87 99.667 13-Sep-91 82.745 30-Sep-97 73.794
16-Nov-82 56.458 4-Sep-87 83.527 1-Oct-91 92.774 12-Nov-97 84.279
19-Nov-82 82.696 22-Sep-87 76.965 31-Oct-91 84.166 16-Dec-97 94.136
14-Dec-82 91.507 23-Oct-87 47.994 5-Nov-91 95.441 4-Feb-98 99.125
21-Dec-82 58.042 28-Oct-87 77.105 6-Nov-91 94.176 31-Mar-98 66.750
9-Feb-83 60.342 3-Nov-87 36.788 6-Dec-91 98.857 19-May-98 78.709
29-Mar-83 90.758 16-Dec-87 23.417 17-Dec-91 96.630 1-Jul-98 45.158
24-May-83 70.795 28-Jan-88 92.841 20-Dec-91 93.863 18-Aug-98 98.347
23-Jun-83 88.481 10-Feb-88 42.694 5-Feb-92 98.151 29-Sep-98 81.451
13-Jul-83 88.216 29-Mar-88 94.176 31-Mar-92 93.264 15-Oct-98 83.224
23-Aug-83 86.190 9-May-88 90.840 9-Apr-92 92.973 17-Nov-98 57.538
4-Oct-83 60.758 17-May-88 76.593 19-May-92 88.331 22-Dec-98 89.621
15-Nov-83 94.982 25-May-88 88.692 1-Jul-92 82.944 3-Feb-99 99.005
20-Dec-83 86.791 22-Jun-88 92.166 2-Jul-92 88.692 30-Mar-99 94.948
31-Jan-84 83.527 30-Jun-88 52.905 18-Aug-92 95.421 18-May-99 73.807
27-Mar-84 51.373 9-Aug-88 70.678 4-Sep-92 89.583 30-Jun-99 75.604
22-May-84 86.447 16-Aug-88 88.161 6-Oct-92 91.829 24-Aug-99 83.417
17-Jul-84 93.534 20-Sep-88 96.239 17-Nov-92 79.283 5-Oct-99 89.121
21-Aug-84 83.393 1-Nov-88 97.045 22-Dec-92 95.083 16-Nov-99 95.531
2-Oct-84 79.673 22-Nov-88 77.050 3-Feb-93 55.512 21-Dec-99 77.105
7-Nov-84 62.683 14-Dec-88 87.052 23-Mar-93 89.611 2-Feb-00 95.682
21-Nov-84 92.723 5-Jan-89 88.061 18-May-93 84.953 21-Mar-00 91.893
18-Dec-84 28.682 8-Feb-89 94.546 7-Jul-93 72.274 16-May-00 82.632
13-Feb-85 88.119 14-Feb-89 96.319 17-Aug-93 94.469 28-Jun-00 95.727
21-Feb-85 85.214 24-Feb-89 80.367 21-Sep-93 80.018 22-Aug-00 80.358
26-Mar-85 68.804 28-Mar-89 74.862 16-Nov-93 90.222 3-Oct-00 91.236
18-Apr-85 75.910 16-May-89 72.989 21-Dec-93 99.917 15-Nov-00 95.504
17-May-85 81.523 6-Jun-89 98.230 4-Feb-94 88.150 19-Dec-00 80.707
21-May-85 82.283 6-Jul-89 75.148 22-Mar-94 94.511 3-Jan-01 99.115
10-Jul-85 90.617 27-Jul-89 78.297 18-Apr-94 96.400 31-Jan-01 99.161
1-Aug-85 71.355 22-Aug-89 77.492 17-May-94 74.119 20-Mar-01 98.228
20-Aug-85 75.462 3-Oct-89 92.184 6-Jul-94 53.275 18-Apr-01 88.161
6-Sep-85 72.313 19-Oct-89 89.665 16-Aug-94 79.728 15-May-01 91.057
1-Oct-85 69.680 6-Nov-89 79.189 27-Sep-94 58.962 27-Jun-01 77.958
5-Nov-85 84.754 14-Nov-89 99.667 15-Nov-94 66.546 21-Aug-01 92.360
17-Dec-85 93.975 19-Dec-89 93.084 20-Dec-94 94.098 17-Sep-01 50.441
12-Feb-86 85.013 7-Feb-90 77.668 1-Feb-95 55.334 2-Oct-01 89.828
7-Mar-86 91.165 27-Mar-90 92.256 28-Mar-95 80.867 6-Nov-01 96.039
1-Apr-86 83.841 15-May-90 79.477 23-May-95 86.336 11-Dec-01 97.425
18-Apr-86 83.591 3-Jul-90 90.644 6-Jul-95 86.445 30-Jan-02 96.810
20-May-86 81.576 13-Jul-90 95.805 22-Aug-95 87.385 19-Mar-02 86.620
5-Jun-86 82.696 21-Aug-90 82.146 26-Sep-95 100.000 7-May-02 97.359
9-Jul-86 89.583 2-Oct-90 74.107 15-Nov-95 94.635 26-Jun-02 92.496
10-Jul-86 99.005 29-Oct-90 82.604 19-Dec-95 94.958 13-Aug-02 93.749
14-Aug-86 93.501 13-Nov-90 99.402 31-Jan-96 85.611 24-Sep-02 99.210
19-Aug-86 95.759 7-Dec-90 72.062 26-Mar-96 84.322 6-Nov-02 92.527
20-Aug-86 98.020 18-Dec-90 80.367 21-May-96 90.484 10-Dec-02 97.531
23-Sep-86 86.672 9-Jan-91 38.180 3-Jul-96 97.987 29-Jan-03 97.310
5-Nov-86 56.027 1-Feb-91 45.955 20-Aug-96 85.137 18-Mar-03 97.015
16-Dec-86 84.523 6-Feb-91 72.615 24-Sep-96 88.988 6-May-03 93.048
15-Jan-87 30.422 8-Mar-91 85.458 13-Nov-96 87.013 25-Jun-03 97.656
11-Feb-87 72.172 26-Mar-91 94.727 17-Dec-96 89.778 12-Aug-03 93.920
31-Mar-87 93.437 30-Apr-91 85.535 5-Feb-97 89.529 16-Sep-03 98.964
30-Apr-87 25.875 14-May-91 96.464 25-Mar-97 88.611 28-Oct-03 94.112
19-May-87 68.124 3-Jul-91 87.284 20-May-97 82.611 9-Dec-03 99.466
7-Jul-87 93.324 6-Aug-91 94.793 2-Jul-97 85.699
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Table 5: Policy Regime Changes and Monetary Transparency -
Standard Errors Adjusted for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation in Brackets
Period Quarterly Index Daily Index
Oct. 1982-Aug. 1987 77.75 (2.79) 80.84 (1.14)
Change in: 
Aug. 1987-Dec. 2003: Greenspan period* 8.06 (3.07) 6.26 (1.22)
Oct. 1982-Oct. 1989 78.19 (2.20) 81.81 (0.86)
Change in: 
Oct. 1989-Dec. 2003: 25 and 50 bp period** 8.66 (2.52) 5.78 (0.98)
Oct. 1982-Feb. 1994 81.26 (1.73) 83.14 (0.66)
Change in: 
Feb. 1994-Dec. 2003: Announcing Target Change
period***
5.83 (2.29) 5.43 (0.84)
Oct. 1982-Aug. 1997 82.11 (1.48) 83.79 (0.54)
Change in: 
Aug. 1997-Dec. 2003: Target & NY period**** 6.19 (2.33) 6.28 (0.83)
Oct. 1982-May. 1999 82.24 (1.36) 84.10 (0.50)
Change in: 
May. 1999-Dec. 2003: Explanation period***** 7.87 (2.44) 7.22 (0.86)
Oct. 1982-Feb. 2000 82.22 (1.29) 84.24 (0.48)
Change in: 
Feb. 2000-Dec. 2003: Balance of Risk
period******
9.45 (2.32) 7.78 (0.89)
Oct. 1982-Mar. 2002 82.81 (1.22) 84.81 (0.46)
Change in: 
Mar. 2002-Dec. 2003: Vote & Names
period*******
12.68 (1.38) 10.22 (0.66)
*Alan Greenspan took office as Chairman of the Fed on August 11, 1987.
** On October 19, 1989 the Fed started the practice of changing the fed funds target rate in multiples of 25
and 50 basis points.
***Beginning on February 4, 1994 the Fed started announcing policy decisions at the conclusion of the
FOMC meetings. 
****The FOMC started to include a quantitative fed funds rate in its Directive to the NY Fed Trading desk.
***** Since May 18, 1999 the Fed extended its explanations regarding policy decisions, and started to
include in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective developments (or the
policy bias). 
****** On January 19, 2000, the FOMC issued a press statement explaining that they would include a
balance-of-risks sentence in their statements, replacing the previous bias statement. The practice was first
implemented the following FOMC meeting, on February 2.
******* Since March 19, 2002, the Fed has included in FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the
names of dissenter members (if any).
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Table 6: GLS Estimation of Volatility and Transparency Index***
Variables* Daily data - Dep. Var.= VFF
Coeff. (Std.Error**)
Monthly data - Dep. Var.= VFF
Coeff. (Std.Error**)
Daily data - Dep. Var.= VTB
Coeff.(Std.Error**)
Constant 1.71 (0.19) 0.32 (0.02) 0.02 (0.0023)
LTt - 0.31 (0.03) - 0.0003 (0.00001) - 0.002 (0.001)
VFFt-1 0.13 (0.02) 0.18 (0.07) -
VFFt-5 - - -0.002 (0.0009)
VFFt-15 - - -0.002 (0.0003)
VFFt-17 0.32 (0.02) - -
VTBt-1 - - 0.58 (0.03)
VTBt-2 - 0.26 (0.08) - 0.38 (0.03)
VTBt-3 - - 0.09 (0.03)
VTBt-4 - - - 0.13 (0.02)
VTBt-5 - - - 0.32 (0.03)
VTBt-6 - - 0.09 (0.02)
VTBt-7 - - 0.18 (0.02)
VERt-3 0.0001 (0.00001) - -
VERt-9 0.001 (0.0001) - -
VERt-10 0.001 (0.0002) - -
VERt-11 0.0003 (0.0001) - -
VERt-12 0.001 (0.0001) - -
VERt-14 - 0.01 (0.001) - -
VERt-15 - 0.01 (0.004) - -
VERt-17 0.0001 (0.00001) - -
VERt-19 0.001 (0.00004) - -
VERt-20 0.0004 (0.0001) - -
GREENt - - -0.002 (0.0004)
TAFt - - 0.14 (0.01) -0.002 (0.0005)
OCT87t - 0.03 (0.008) -
ASIAt - - -0.006 (0.001)
D851231t - - -0.05 (0.0007)
D861231t - - -0.03 (0.003)
D940418t - 0.05 (0.004) - -0.01 (0.0004)
D000202t - - -0.02 (0.0003)
D010103t - - -0.02 (0.0002)
D010418t - - -0.02 (0.0003)
D010917t - - -0.03 (0.0004)
D020319t - - 0.06 (0.006) -
Marcht - - 0.09 (0.01) -
Mayt - - 0.08 (0.003) -
Augustt - -0.11 (0.006) -
R 2 and σ 0.30.and 0.14 0.91 and 0.03 0.88 and 0.0007
* Variables VFFt, VTBt and VERt are autoregressive conditional volatility of the first differences of fed funds rate, Treasury bills
rate and the sum of the excess reserves of the depository institutions, respectively. Dummy variables are: GREEN=1 since
August 11, 1987 and zero, otherwise, TAFt=l since October 19, 1989 and zero, otherwise, OCT87t=1 for October 19 to 30, 1987
and zero, otherwise, ASIA=1 for October 17 to 30, 1997 and zero, otherwise, D851231t and D861231t are equal to 1 on
December 30 and 31, 1985 and December 31, 1986, respectively, and to zero, otherwise, D940418=1 on April 18, 1994 and zero,
otherwise, D000202=1 on February 2, 2000 and zero, otherwise, D010103=1 on January 3, 2001 and zero, otherwise,
D010418=1 on April 18, 2001 and zero, otherwise, D010917=1 on August 17, 2001 and zero, otherwise, and D020319=1 on
March 19, 2002 and zero, otherwise. Finally, dummy variables March, May and August are equal to 1 for the months of March,
May and April, respectively, and to zero, otherwise. 
** The Newey and West (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average was used to correct for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity.
*** The estimation method is GLS and σ is the standard error of the regression.
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Figure 2: Extended Transparency Index
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
10
/5
/1
98
2
10
/5
/1
98
3
10
/5
/1
98
4
10
/5
/1
98
5
10
/5
/1
98
6
10
/5
/1
98
7
10
/5
/1
98
8
10
/5
/1
98
9
10
/5
/1
99
0
10
/5
/1
99
1
10
/5
/1
99
2
10
/5
/1
99
3
10
/5
/1
99
4
10
/5
/1
99
5
10
/5
/1
99
6
10
/5
/1
99
7
10
/5
/1
99
8
10
/5
/1
99
9
10
/5
/2
00
0
10
/5
/2
00
1
10
/5
/2
00
2
10
/5
/2
00
3
